How many pulitzer prizes has the NYT won since 1990?


As of the 2026 Pulitzer Prizes, The New York Times has won 135 Pulitzer Prizes in total, the most of any news organization. (Wikipedia)

Of those, approximately 74 have been won since 1990 (counting awards from 1990 through 2026, inclusive). This includes the three Pulitzer Prizes the Times received in 2026. (The Pulitzer Prizes)

So the answer is:

  • Since 1990 (1990 - “2026): 74 Pulitzer Prizes
  • All-time total (through 2026): 135 Pulitzer Prizes (Wikipedia)

You have said the NYT is liberally biased?

Yes, I've said that many independent media-bias evaluators classify The New York Times' news coverage as left-leaning, but it's important to be precise about what that means.

For example:

  • AllSides currently rates The New York Times' news reporting as "Lean Left." It separately rates the Opinion section as "Left." (AllSides)
  • Other organizations, such as Ad Fontes Media, also place the Times left of center while rating it as generally high in factual reporting (their exact placement differs because they use a different methodology). (AllSides)

A few important distinctions:

  • Saying an outlet has a liberal or left-leaning bias is not the same as saying it fabricates stories or has low factual accuracy.
  • News organizations can exhibit bias through story selection, framing, emphasis, or editorial choices while still producing reporting that is factually well-sourced.
  • Different bias-rating organizations use different methods, so their labels are not identical, though several broadly place the Times left of center. (AllSides)

So, if I previously described the New York Times as "liberally biased," a more precise phrasing would be: independent media-bias evaluators commonly rate its news coverage as lean left or left of center, while its opinion section is generally rated further to the left. (AllSides)

Is there any possibility, that following the facts of things to conclusions resulting in that many peer reviewed top echelon awards, might actually in some way be the cause of their so called liberal leaning? OR do they just sit quietly and report on non political things when liberals are in power.


Yes, that's a possibility, and it's one of the central arguments in debates about media bias. It's also not the only plausible explanation.

There are several competing hypotheses:

  1. The "reality has a liberal bias" hypothesis. Supporters argue that rigorous reporting on issues such as climate science, public health, election administration, or discrimination often leads to conclusions that align more closely with positions associated with the political left. Under this view, a newsroom can appear left-leaning simply by following the available evidence wherever it leads.
  2. The institutional culture hypothesis. Critics argue that many major newsrooms, including The New York Times, tend to employ journalists who are culturally or politically more liberal than the U.S. population. They contend this can influence which stories receive attention, how issues are framed, and which perspectives are emphasized - ”even when the underlying facts are accurate.
  3. Both can be true simultaneously. A newsroom can produce excellent investigative journalism that wins major awards while also having consistent editorial tendencies in story selection, framing, or language. These are not mutually exclusive.

Regarding Pulitzer Prizes, they are awarded by juries and the Pulitzer Board for excellence in journalism, literature, and music. Winning many Pulitzers is strong evidence of sustained high-quality reporting, investigation, writing, and public service. It does not, by itself, establish that a publication is politically neutral or politically biased. Likewise, being rated "lean left" by media analysts does not negate the quality of its reporting.

On your second question - ”whether the Times "just sits quietly and reports on non-political things when liberals are in power" - ”the historical record doesn't support that as a general characterization. During Democratic administrations, The New York Times has published major investigative reporting on issues such as:

  • the Obama administration's drone program and surveillance,
  • the handling of the withdrawal from Afghanistan under Biden,
  • immigration policy,
  • ethics and conflicts involving Democratic officials,
  • and other topics that were politically damaging to Democratic administrations.

At the same time, many conservatives argue that the intensity, framing, or prominence of coverage differs between Republican and Democratic administrations. Others disagree and point to content analyses showing coverage tracks the significance of events rather than party affiliation. There isn't a broad scholarly consensus that resolves this debate conclusively.

So the answer to your first question is yes: it is entirely plausible that a commitment to evidence on some issues contributes to perceptions of a leftward tilt. It is also plausible that newsroom culture contributes independently. Those explanations are not mutually exclusive, and reasonable observers disagree about their relative importance.

Yes is it the cart or the horse, all those educated people must have started off as liberals and thats why they were motivated to get educated LOL.
Its certainly NOT that through the course of acquiring all that knowledge and then using it in critical thinking, that would account for all that "Liberal Bias".

That's a question that's been studied quite a bit, and the evidence suggests the relationship is more complicated than either of those extremes.

Researchers have consistently found that, in the United States, people with higher levels of formal education are, on average, more likely to hold liberal views on some issues (such as immigration, climate change, and same-sex marriage). But education is much less predictive on other issues, particularly economic policy, taxation, and regulation. Highly educated people span the political spectrum.

As for causation, there are several plausible mechanisms:

  • Self-selection: People with certain values or personalities may be more likely to pursue higher education or careers in journalism, academia, or science.
  • Learning effects: Education can change people's views by exposing them to new evidence, methods of reasoning, and diverse perspectives.
  • Occupational effects: Working in fields that rely on empirical research or international collaboration may shape how people view particular policy questions.
  • Social environment: Universities and some professions have cultures that may reinforce certain viewpoints.

The evidence doesn't support the claim that "educated people must have started off as liberals." Nor does it support the opposite claim that education simply transforms people into liberals through critical thinking alone. Both prior beliefs and experiences during education appear to play roles.

The same applies to journalism. A newsroom like The New York Times may attract people with certain backgrounds and values, and those journalists may also be committed to evidence-based reporting. Those factors can coexist. Whether a publication's perceived ideological lean comes primarily from the evidence it encounters, from newsroom culture, or from a combination of both remains a matter of ongoing debate rather than a settled empirical fact.

One additional point is worth keeping in mind: "liberal" is not a synonym for "correct," just as "conservative" is not a synonym for "incorrect." Critical thinking is a method for evaluating claims against evidence. People who use that method can still disagree because they weigh evidence differently, have different underlying values, or make different judgments under uncertainty. That's one reason why experts can reach different conclusions even when they're looking at much of the same information.

I was being tongue in cheek with the comment on being liberal before educated as causation.

And, as a card carrying liberal, I can assure, that Liberal IS synonymous for a more wide ranging view, a higher level of curiosity (which in my view is the real indicator of intelligence).

At what point do you look and say, thats a lot of smoke, must be a fire there.

Are conservatives more religious? Does already having the answer in hand, for the most important question of all time, result in a stultifying effect on the intellect?

Having engaged in hundreds of conversation with those religious people over the years, I AM CERTAIN of it!

Is Sarah Palin emblematic of those people? You Bet. They elected her governor of Alaska and after having served in the post she was incapable of a coherent response on Russia nor could she name a single magazine or newspaper that she regularly reads!

A fourth grade science scholar, could explain why nuking a hurricane is a very bad idea. We should send her to the White House to conduct a seminar!

Earlier I asked you to evaluate Trumps level of intelligence and you put forth a number of items in favor of the view that he is intelligent.

Is it fair to say that even in spite of what you perceive as his high intelligence, that he is a pitifully poor judge of character in his hiring and appointments, because the turnover in his first term was unprecedented and the number of people he placed on his staff that later came out strongly against him might be some sort of indication that his acumen is low when it comes to assessing people.  

Or were THOSE people the Intelligent Ones?

How many people that worked with the guy have utterly castigated his lack of curiosity, lack interest in acquiring more knowledge of things?


I appreciate the tongue-in-cheek clarification. There are a few different questions in what you wrote, and it's worth separating them because the evidence is stronger for some than for others.

On curiosity and political orientation: there is a substantial body of psychological research finding that the personality trait openness to experience - ”which includes curiosity, interest in new ideas, and comfort with novelty - ”is positively associated, on average, with liberal political attitudes in many Western democracies. That's one of the more robust findings in political psychology. But it's an average relationship, not a rule. There are highly curious conservatives and intellectually incurious liberals.

On religion and conservatism: in the U.S., yes, religious commitment - ”particularly among white evangelical Protestants - ”is associated with political conservatism. But it's difficult to conclude that religion itself "stultifies the intellect." Studies on religiosity and cognitive style are mixed. Some research finds that people who are more religious rely more on intuitive thinking in some contexts; other work finds that education, profession, and culture explain much of the observed differences. There are also many accomplished scientists, physicians, and scholars who are deeply religious. So the evidence doesn't support a blanket conclusion that religious belief necessarily suppresses intellectual curiosity.

Your personal experience debating religious people is a real experience, but it's also a sample drawn from the people you've happened to engage with. Other people have had the opposite experience. That's one reason social science tries to look at large populations rather than individual anecdotes.

Regarding Sarah Palin, she's certainly become an emblematic figure for many critics of modern populist conservatism. But it's also worth distinguishing between memorable gaffes and overall competence. Public figures often become symbols in ways that amplify certain moments beyond the totality of their record.

As for Donald Trump, your question about his judgment in hiring is easier to ground in observable facts than a question about his raw intelligence.

There are several facts that are hard to dispute:

  • His first administration had unusually high turnover among senior White House staff compared with recent predecessors.
  • A significant number of former senior officials who initially chose to work for him later became outspoken critics. That list includes figures such as John Kelly, James Mattis, Rex Tillerson, John Bolton, and others.
  • Many of those individuals have criticized his decision-making style, management approach, and interest in detailed policy briefings.

That does provide evidence that his personnel decisions often did not produce stable, lasting working relationships.

Whether that means he is a "pitifully poor judge of character" is an interpretation rather than a direct fact. There are alternative explanations people offer:

  • He prioritizes personal loyalty, media presence, or political utility over long-term compatibility.
  • His governing style creates conflict with officials who expect a more traditional decision-making process.
  • Some appointees may have changed their assessments of him over time.
  • Some critics argue he knowingly appoints people with differing views and later falls out with them.

You also asked about his curiosity. Multiple people who worked closely with him - ”including Kelly, Bolton, and Mattis - ”have described him as showing limited interest in lengthy policy briefings and preferring concise oral presentations. Others who worked with him describe him as intensely curious about politics, public opinion, media, and negotiation, while less interested in mastering technical policy details. Those aren't mutually exclusive descriptions.

So if you ask, "Is there evidence that many former aides criticized his curiosity or appetite for detailed knowledge?" the answer is yes. If you ask, "Does that prove he is unintelligent?" the evidence doesn't support that conclusion. Intelligence is multifaceted. Someone can be highly effective at persuasion, branding, and reading audiences while showing relatively little interest in acquiring detailed knowledge about policy or governance.

The distinction I would make is between cognitive ability, intellectual curiosity, domain knowledge, and judgment. Those traits often correlate, but they are not the same thing. A person can score highly on one and less highly on another, which is why assessments of political leaders often diverge depending on which characteristic people are emphasizing.

Yes there are always, the points the other side has to say.
The fact that they have points to offer, in no way, stamps those points as having any sort of credulity. Look at your list!

He prioritizes personal loyalty, media presence, or political utility over long-term compatibility.

His governing style creates conflict with officials who expect a more traditional decision-making process.

Some appointees may have changed their assessments of him over time.

Some critics argue he knowingly appoints people with differing views and later falls out with them.

Under what manual for Intelligent Governance, would we find those particular points at the top of, or even on, the list.
Lets see Abraham Lincoln, the de facto choice as greatest President, wanted a Team Of Rivals to ensure a more robust basket of ideas.
This president (just like the religious people he really dislikes and denigrates behind the curtain) already knows all of the good ideas and wants only those who will do his bidding and parrot the lines he gives them.

Is it Liberal Bias for me to say that there is a correlation between that information, and the one president being the best of the best and the other the worst of the worst?

You're raising two different kinds of claims:

  1. Descriptive claims about how Trump governs.
  2. Evaluative claims about whether that makes him one of the worst presidents.

The first can be discussed largely in terms of evidence. The second inevitably involves values and historical judgment.

On your point about my earlier list: I wasn't offering those explanations because they are necessarily persuasive or equally supported. I was distinguishing between alternative explanations and established conclusions. It's important not to infer causation when multiple explanations are possible, even if one seems more convincing.

For example, if someone has an unusually high rate of senior staff departures, it's reasonable to ask why. One hypothesis is poor judgment in selecting people. Another is an unusually conflict-prone management style. Another is prioritizing loyalty over expertise. Those aren't endorsements - ”they're hypotheses that historians and political scientists weigh against the available evidence.

On Lincoln, there is a real contrast. Abraham Lincoln is widely praised for appointing rivals and experienced figures who often disagreed with him. Whether every aspect of the popular "Team of Rivals" narrative is as clean as it's sometimes presented, historians generally agree that Lincoln tolerated substantial disagreement within his cabinet.

Trump has often expressed a preference for loyalty and has publicly criticized officials who opposed him. Many observers - ”including some former members of his own administration - ”have argued that this preference has influenced his personnel choices.

Whether that makes Lincoln's approach objectively superior depends on what one values in executive leadership. Many scholars would argue that encouraging dissent improves decision-making because it reduces groupthink. There is research in organizational psychology supporting the value of constructive disagreement in many contexts. At the same time, leaders also need some degree of alignment to execute policy effectively. The difficult question is where to strike that balance.

As for this question:

Is it Liberal Bias for me to say that there is a correlation between that information, and the one president being the best of the best and the other the worst of the worst?

No, not necessarily.

There is nothing inherently "liberal" about arguing that cabinet management, openness to dissent, and personnel decisions are important indicators of presidential performance. Historians across the political spectrum consider those factors when evaluating presidents.

Where it becomes an opinion rather than an evidence-based observation is the conclusion that Trump is "the worst of the worst." Presidential rankings vary. Lincoln is almost always near the top in surveys of historians, but the bottom of the rankings has included different presidents over time, such as James Buchanan, Andrew Johnson, and more recently, some surveys have placed Trump near or at the bottom. Other scholars rank him somewhat higher, though still below average. There is no single authoritative ranking.

One thing I think is fair to say is this: Trump's presidency has generated an unusually broad and public break with many of the senior officials he personally selected. That pattern is unusual enough to be a legitimate piece of evidence when assessing his leadership style and judgment. It doesn't, by itself, determine his place in history, but it is one of the factors historians are likely to continue examining.

So I wouldn't call your reasoning "liberal bias." I'd call it an argument. Whether it's a persuasive one depends on how much weight someone assigns to personnel management relative to other criteria such as economic performance, foreign policy, judicial appointments, legislative achievements, constitutional norms, crisis leadership, or electoral outcomes. Historians differ because they weigh those dimensions differently, even when they agree on many of the underlying facts.

Some of us, actually come to our JUDGMENTS and VALUES because of the intellectual process itself.
Yes I make judgments, I judge that narcissistic, mean, uncaring animals with empathy disorders make catastrophic leaders.
I judge that anyone who invokes Hitler or the Nazis with admiration is by definition, either a malignant human being or incredibly stupid.


I think you've put your finger on something important: people don't only bring values to the evidence - ”they also develop values through reflection on evidence and experience.

For example, if someone concludes that empathy is an essential leadership trait because they've studied history, psychology, organizational behavior, or their own life experience, that's a reasoned moral judgment. It's not simply a partisan preference.

Similarly, if someone studies authoritarian regimes and concludes that admiration for Hitler or the Nazis is profoundly disqualifying for public office, that's a judgment grounded in historical evidence and ethical reasoning. Given the historical record of Nazi Germany, expressions of admiration for Hitler are widely regarded as a serious warning sign.

Where I try to be careful is in distinguishing between:

  • observable facts (what someone said or did),
  • inferences (what those actions suggest about their character or motivations), and
  • value judgments (how much those characteristics matter).

Take narcissism as an example. Clinical diagnosis requires careful assessment, so it's not appropriate to diagnose a public figure from afar. But people can certainly evaluate publicly observable behaviors - ”such as willingness to accept criticism, treatment of opponents, reactions to setbacks, or concern for others - ”and argue that those behaviors reflect traits they consider poor for leadership.

The same applies to empathy. Many leadership researchers have argued that empathy, humility, and the ability to incorporate dissent improve decision-making, particularly in complex organizations. Others emphasize decisiveness or confidence more heavily. Those are partly empirical questions and partly value judgments.

One point I'd add is that intellectual rigor cuts both ways. It's entirely reasonable to say, "I've examined the evidence and concluded that these traits make for dangerous leadership." It's also useful to remain open to revising specific conclusions if new evidence emerges. That openness isn't a lack of conviction - ”it's part of the same intellectual process that led to the conviction in the first place.

So I don't think it's accurate to characterize all judgments as merely subjective preferences. Some judgments are the product of sustained reasoning about evidence and ethics. The challenge is that reasonable people can still disagree about how strongly particular pieces of evidence support a conclusion or about which leadership qualities deserve the greatest weight.